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The Untimely Demise of the Involuntary
Confession Material Witness Rule in
Illinois
STEPHANIE RAE WILLIAMS*

INTRODUCTION

In 1922, while responding to a newspaper article criticizing a trial
judge, the Illinois Supreme Court created the "Material Witness
Rule."' The court, in People v. Rogers,2 ruled that, when a criminal
defendant moves to suppress his or her confession, the State must
call all material witnesses to the confession to establish its voluntariness.3 Failure of the prosecution to call all material witnesses or to
satisfactorily explain their absence became reversible error requiring
a new trial. 4 Despite its inauspicious beginning, the material witness
rule soon gained clear acceptance by a majority of the Illinois Supreme
Court.5 Nonetheless, it also provided a subject for great dispute among
Illinois judges.
*

6

Lecturer, Loyola University Chicago School of Law; Judicial Law Clerk to

the Honorable Edward J. Egan, Illinois Appellate Court, First Judicial District; B.S.,
1989, Northwestern University; J.D. cum laude, 1992, Loyola University Chicago.
1. People v. Rogers, 136 N.E. 470 (Ill. 1922); People v. R.D., 613 N.E.2d
706, 712 (Ill. 1993).
2. 136 N.E. 470 (Ill. 1922).
3. Id. at 473.
4. Id. For application of this rule by the Illinois Supreme Court, see People
v. Wright, 180 N.E.2d 689 (Ill. 1962); People v. Dale, 171 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1960);
People v. Sammons, 161 N.E.2d 322 (Ill.
1959); People v. Jennings, 144 N.E.2d 612
(Ill. 1957); People v. Wagoner, 133 N.E.2d 24 (Ill. 1956); People v. Gavurnik, 117
N.E.2d 782 (Il. 1954); People v. LaCoco, 94 N.E.2d 178 (Ill. 1950); People v. Davis,
77 N.E.2d 703 (Il1. 1948); People v. Kraus, 69 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. 1946); People v.
Ickes, 19 N.E.2d 373 (Ill. 1939); People v. Arendarczyk, 12 N.E.2d 2 (Il1. 1937);
People v. Cope, 178 N.E. 95 (Ill. 1931); People v. Holick, 169 N.E. 169 (Ill. 1929);
People v. Spranger, 145 N.E. 706 (Il. 1924); People v. Sweeney, 136 N.E. 687 (Ill.
1922).
5. See supra note 4; see also People v. Armstrong, 282 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ill.
1972) (explaining that the court "has consistently" applied the rule).
6. Armstrong, 282 N.E.2d at 716-17 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting); People v.
Sims, 173 N.E.2d 494, 498-99 (Ill. 1961) (House, i., specially concurring); People v.
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The Illinois Supreme Court recently settled this controversy by
first greatly limiting the material witness rule7 and then entirely
eliminating it just four months later.8 In December, 1992, the court,
in People v. Patterson,9 held that the rule "should no longer be
applied mechanically" and refused to employ it when a trial judge
determined "that the testimony of a certain 'material witness' was
not needed."' 0 Then, on April 15, 1993, the court decided People v.
R.D." and concluded that "the material witness rule should be
repudiated entirely.' ' 2 The court held that the rule was no longer
necessary for the protection of criminal defendants' Fifth Amendment
rights.
This article analyzes the court's action as well as the possible
impact of R.D. on Illinois criminal procedure. First, the article
examines the creation and application of the material witness rule.'"
Next, it explains the recent changes made by the Illinois Supreme

Dale, 171 N.E.2d 1, 3-4 (Il. 1960) (Bristow, J., dissenting). Despite the judicial

debate, the rule has engendered little scholarly attention. See generally Howard B.

Eisenberg, Confessions, in ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 59 (Ralph Ruebner ed.,
student edition 1988) (explaining application of the rule); Robert J. Steigmann, The
PreliminaryHearing in Illinois, 66 ILL. B. J. 700, 702-03 (1978) (noting the existence
of the rule and suggesting that prosecutors request a continuance to obtain all
necessary witnesses if a defendant makes a surprise motion to suppress at the
preliminary hearing); James P. Carey & Paul A. Gilman, Survey of the Law: Criminal
Procedure, 19 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 429, 436 (1988) (briefly discussing application of
the rule).
7. People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 31-32 (111. 1992) (limiting the rule's
application when a trial judge states that he or she is satisfied the State has presented
enough testimony); see infra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
8. People v. R.D., 613 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ill. 1993); see infra notes 138-52 and
accompanying text.
9. 610 N.E.2d 16 (Ill. 1992).
10. R.D., 613 N.E.2d at 714.
11. 613 N.E.2d 706 (111. 1993). This opinion decides two cases that were
consolidated by the supreme court: People v. R.D. and People v. Blankenship. The
Illinois Supreme Court hears most cases only on a discretionary basis, after granting
leave to appeal. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 315, Historical Note at 309-10
(Smith-Hurd 1985). The State filed petitions for leave to appeal both R.D. and
Blankenship on the same day, and each petition references the other. Petition for
Leave to Appeal at 13, People v. R.D., (Ill. 1993) (No. 72268); Petition for Leave
to Appeal at 10-11, People v. Blankenship, (Ill. 1992) (No. 72269).
12. R.D., 613 N.E.2d at 714.
13. See infra notes 37-90 and accompanying text. The rule existed from 1922
until 1993. See infra text accompanying notes 37, 112.
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Court and attacks the reasoning behind those changes. 4 The article
then examines the potential effect the elimination of the rule will have
on criminal defendants. 5 Finally, this article concludes that the material witness rule served a necessary Fifth Amendment purpose in
6
Illinois and should be resurrected by the legislature.1
I.

CREATION OF THE MATERIAL WITNESS RULE

The material witness rule always has been recognized as part of
Fifth Amendment jurisprudence, 7 even when the exact rationale
behind the rule has been in dispute. 8 This stems from the early
recognition in both Illinois and the federal system that use of an
involuntary confession violates a criminal defendant's Fifth Amendment rights. 19
14.
15.
16.
17.

See infra notes 106-77 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 153-77, 182-85 and accompanying text.
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in perti-

nent part: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness

against himself." U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment was incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). See also
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965). Also, the Illinois Constitution contains virtually the same provision. The
Illinois Constitution provides: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself." ILL. CONST. art. I, § 10. Illinois courts give both the
Federal and State provisions "the same general construction." MICHAEL H. GRAHAM,
CLEARY & GRAHAM's HANDBOOK ON ILLINOIS EVIDENCE § 502.1, at 238 (5th ed. 1991)
(citing People ex rel Hanrahan v. Power, 295 N.E.2d 472 (1973); People v. Lynch,
404 N.E.2d 814 (1980)). Therefore, any reference to the Fifth Amendment in this
article should be construed as also including the Illinois provision.
18. See infra notes 64-67, 74-79, 90-91, & part III.
19. The general ideals of the Fifth Amendment were applied in Illinois before
its incorporation and before the adoption of the material witness rule. People v.
Buckminster, 113 N.E. 713, 715 (Ill. 1916); see also infra notes 23-28 and accompanying text.
Also, it has long been accepted that involuntary confessions violate the Fifth
Amendment. In 1960, the Supreme Court referred to its voluntariness test for
confession admissibility as the "clearly established test in Anglo-American courts for
two hundred years." Colombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961) (opinion of
Frankfurter, J.); see, e.g., Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Lynumm v.
Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963); Wilfred J. Ritz, Twenty-five Years of State Criminal
Confession Cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, 19 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 35 (1962);
Cynthia Bauman, Note, Arizona v. Fulminante: Coerced Confessions and the Error
in Harmless Error Analysis, 23 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 103, 105 (1991). Today, it is not
clear whether this test was entirely based on the Fifth Amendment. See EDWARD W.
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GENERAL CONFESSION LAW IN ILLINOIS

Although a detailed examination of involuntary confession 20 law
is beyond the scope of this article, a brief overview of that law is
necessary for an understanding of the material witness rule in Illinois. 21
As early as 1853, just thirty-five years after Illinois became a state ,22
the Illinois Supreme Court declared that coerced confessions may not
be admitted in criminal trials. 23 The court was not creating new law
on this issue, but applying a well-established doctrine carried to this
country with the common law. 24 In 1866, the court explained that this
doctrine, "in most commendable contrast" to ancient Roman law,
§ 147, at 372-76 (3d ed. 1984); Ritz, supra,
at 43-51; Developments in the Law-Confessions, 79 HARV. L. REV. 935, 938 (1966);
CLEARY ET AL, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE

Bauman, supra, at 105-06. Additionally, there is some debate about the underpinnings

of the current involuntary confession rule. See generally Bauman, supra, at 106-09

(providing an excellent discussion of this debate).
The debate, however, was not yet raging in 1922. Therefore, that debate is
beyond the scope of this article and not necessary to an understanding of how the
material witness rule, created before the Fifth Amendment was applied to the states,
fits into Illinois criminal procedure. At the time the Illinois Supreme Court decided
Rogers, the only major pronouncement on this subject by the United States Supreme
Court was Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897). Brain made the Fifth
Amendment basis for the exclusion of coerced confessions very clear, though only in
federal prosecutions. See supra note 17. For general discussions of Brain, see Wan
v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924); 4 CHARLES TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE § 634, at 143 (14th ed. 1987). It was not until 1936, when the Court held
that the use of a coerced confession in a state trial violated the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause, that the basis for the exclusion became disputed. Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); see B. JAMES GEORGE, JR., CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 88-90 (1966); Monrad G. Paulsen, The
Fourteenth Amendment and the Third Degree, 6
opments in the Law-Confessions, supra.

STAN.

L. REV. 411 (1954); Devel-

20. This article uses the terms "involuntary confession" and "coerced confession" as synonyms.
21. For the interested reader, there are many comprehensive articles discussing
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and their impact on involuntary confessions.

See, e.g, Daniel J. Capra, Prisoners of Their Own Jurisprudence:Fourth and Fifth
Amendment Cases in the Supreme Court, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1267 (1991); supra notes

17-19.

22. Illinois was the twenty-first state admitted to the Union. It attained statehood on December 3, 1818. II MARY BETH NORTON ET AL., A PEOPLE AND A NATION:
A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES A-24 (1986).
23. Gates v. People, 14 11. 433 (1853); see, e.g., Miller v. People, 39 Ill. 457
(1866); Robinson v. People, 42 N.E. 375 (Ill. 1895); People v. Vinci, 129 N.E. 193
(Ill. 1920); Charles H. Davis, Adequate Criminal Procedures in Our Courts, 58 ILL.
B.J. 332 (1970); Criminal Law-Evidence- When a Confession is Competent, 6 ILL.

L.Q. 89 (1923) (discussing People v. Kluyczek, 138 N.E. 275 (1923)).
24. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542 (1897); People v. Buckminster,
113 N.E. 713, 715 (11. 1916).
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was "fashioned in a spirit .

.

. just and humane" by requiring the

2
prosecution to prove the voluntariness of any disputed confession. 1
Illinois adopted the traditional voluntariness test for assessing challenged confessions, 26 and in fact still applies that test today. 27 Thus,
an Illinois court must view the "totality of all relevant circumstances"
28

to determine confession admissibility.
A definite pre-trial procedure for this voluntariness determination
was established in 1953, when the Illinois General Assembly created

a statutory pre-trial motion to suppress. 29 Under the statute, once a
defendant makes a sufficient 0 motion to suppress, the State has the

burden of proving a confession's voluntariness by a preponderance
of the evidence.3 1 The prosecution also has the burden of proving

25. Miller, 39 111.at 462. By 1916, the supreme court could confidently explain:
"The authorities in this country are practically a unit in holding that a confession
not freely and voluntarily made cannot be admitted in evidence." Buckminster, 113
N.E. at 715 (citations omitted).
26. Gates, 14 I11.at 436-37; see, e.g., Vinci, 129 N.E. at 195; People v. Hall,
110 N.E.2d 249, 254 (I1l. 1953); supra note 19.
27. People v. Ralon, 462 N.E.2d 701, 704 (I11.App. Ct. 1991); People v.
Cooper, 421 N.E.2d 934, 937 (I11.App. Ct. 1981); George P. Lynch, Pretrial Motion
Practice in State Criminal Cases-Part11, 51 CHI. B. REc. 349 (1970); Walter V.
Schaefer, Police Interrogationand the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 61 Nw.

U. L.

REV. 506 (1966).
28. People v. Lamb, 336 N.E.2d 753, 756 (I11.1975); People v. Johnson, 256
N.E.2d 343, 347 (I11.1970). For a discussion of the voluntariness test in the federal
courts, see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959); CLEARY, supra note 19, § 147,
at 372-76. This test is a true "totality" test; the court must consider all relevant
factors and no single factor has been deemed universally determinative of voluntariness. See Bauman, supra note 19, at 106.
29. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 736.1 (1953) (enacted effective July 15, 1953).
This section, now 725 ILCS 5/114-11 (1993), provides in relevant part: "Prior to the
trial of any criminal case a defendant may move to suppress as evidence any confession
given by him on the ground that it was not voluntary." 725 ILCS 5/114-11(a) (1992).
Before 1953, a separate hearing on confession admissibility could be requested by
the defendant; this procedure simply was not explicitly allowed by the Illinois Code
of Criminal Procedure until 1953. See, e.g., People v. Ardelean, 13 N.E.2d 976 (I11.
1938); People v. Fox, 150 N.E. 347 (I11.1926); People v. Rogers, 136 N.E. 470 (Ill.
1922).
30. A motion to suppress must "state facts showing wherein the confession is
involuntary" and must be in writing. 725 ILCS 5/114-11 (b) (1992); People v. Lamb,
336 N.E.2d 753, 757 (1975). As interpreted, this requirement basically means that
the motion must allege some facts which, if true, would tend to show involuntariness.
725 ILCS 5/114-11(c) (1992); People v. Knight, 388 N.E.2d 414 (111. 1979). Once this
requirement is fulfilled, the judge must hold a suppression hearing, outside the
presence of the jury. 725 ILCS 5/114-11(c) (1992); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368
(1964); GRAHAM, supra note 17, § 104.3, at 38.
31. 725 ILCS 5/114-11(d) (1992). According to the United States Supreme

110
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confession voluntariness under federal constitutional law.12 The Illinois statute governing suppression motions explains that the State
carries this burden as well as the initial burden of going forward with
the evidence at the suppression hearing. 33 After the State establishes
a primafacie case of voluntariness,3 4 the defense has an "evidentiary
obligation to rebut" the prima facie case.35 On appeal, a reviewing
court will only reverse the trial judge's determination that a confession
was voluntary if the judge abused his or her discretion by making a
'3 6
finding "contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence."
B. PEOPLE V. ROGERS

The Illinois Supreme Court first mentioned the need to call all
material witnesses to allegedly coerced confessions in a 1922 case,
People v. Rogers.37 In Rogers, the defendant3" was convicted3 9 of
Court, this issue does not involve an element of the crime charged, and thus does
not necessitate proof beyond a reasonable doubt as required by In re Winship, 397
U.S. 358 (1970). Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972). Although some states rejected
the Lego holding that Winship was not applicable to confession voluntariness, Illinois
chose to apply the preponderance of the evidence standard. People v. Prim, 289
N.E.2d 601, 606 (II1. 1972); cf. People v. Jiminez, 580 P.2d 672 (Cal. 1978) (rejecting
Lego); see CRIMINAL LAW DIGEST § 43.140, at 696 (3d ed. 1983).

Under Illinois common law, the State had this burden before the statute was
enacted. See People v. Basile, 190 N.E. 307 (1934).
32. See Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145 (1968); supra note 31.
33. 725 ILCS 5/114-11 (1992). This section explains:
The burden of going forward with the evidence and the burden of proving
that a confession was voluntary shall be on the State. Objection to the
failure of the State to call all material witnesses on the issue of whether the
confession was voluntary must be made in the trial court.
725 ILCS 5/114-11 (1992); see supra note 31.

34. Nonetheless, the trial judge is permitted to require the defendant to present
his or her evidence first, as long as the judge does not improperly shift any burden
of proof to the defendant. People v. Reid, 554 N.E.2d 174, 185 (Ill. 1990); People
v. Allen, 498 N.E.2d 838 (Il. App. Ct. 1986).
35. Reid, 554 N.E.2d at 186; see generally People v. Nixon, 20 N.E.2d 789
(111. 1939); Allen, 498 N.E.2d at 839.
36. People v. Prim, 289 N.E.2d 601, 606 (I1. 1972) (citing Lego v. Twomey,

404 U.S. 477 (1972)); People v. Golson, 207 N.E.2d 68, 70 (Il. 1965); People v.

Bates, 578 N.E.2d 240 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991); People v. Lopez, 584 N.E.2d 462 (Ill.

App. Ct. 1991); Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 64. For an in-depth discussion of the

applicable standard of review, see Timothy P. O'Neil, Standards of Review in Illinois

Criminal Cases: The Need for Major Reform, 17 S.ILL. U. L.J. 51 (1992).
1922). The Rogers court cited very little authority, but
37. 136 N.E. 470 (I11.
obviously was following the law outlined above. See supra notes 20-28 and accompanying text; infra text accompanying note 51. The court explained that a confession
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robbing the Western Newspaper Union's payroll clerk in Chicago.4

The State had very strong evidence against Rogei s.4 The trial judge,

however, refused to admit a confession Rogers made while in police
custody. The only evidence presented by the State in favor of confession admission was testimony by the robbed payroll clerk. The clerk
testified that when he viewed Rogers at the police station, "Rogers
answered readily and apparently voluntarily and willingly." ' 42 The
judge granted Roger's request to exclude 43 the confession because a
witness testified that Rogers had a "discolored face" after being in
custody and because "there was evidence of complaint before other
judges .. .that Rogers had been 'sweated' and beaten until he made
the confession." 44
After the judge ruled the confession inadmissible, while the trial
was still in progress, the Herald Examiner5 ran an article titled "Cops
Protest Court Ban on Confessions. ' 46 This article, as quoted by the
Rogers court, explained:

extorted by police coercion "is under the law absolutely inadmissible against the
prisoner on the trial, and in this court it is not possible for the people to sustain a
judgment in any criminal case where the record shows that it was had on a confession
so obtained." Id. at 474.
38. Rogers, 136 N.E.2d at 474. Rogers, the defendant, was 19 years-old at the
time of trial. Id.
39. Another man was convicted for the robbery with Rogers. Five men worked
together to commit the crime; only three were tried. Of these three, only Rogers was
still a defendant on appeal. One of his co-defendants was acquitted and the other,
although convicted with Rogers, fled the State during the trial. Id. at 471-72.
40. Id. at 471.
41. The court noted that the "evidence in the record" showed clear proof of
guilt. Id. at 473. The clerk and an assistant both lived through the robbery and both
identified Rogers as one of the robbers. Id. at 472. They were certain of their
identification "because of [Roger's] unusual appearance, and particularly with reference to his ...

very blond hair ...

[and) reddish, teary or watery eyes." Id. Other

witnesses placed Rogers near the scene, and he was seen fleeing from the robbers'
car after it crashed into the Chicago Fire Chief's car while leaving the scene. Id. at
472-73. Rogers raised an alibi defense at trial, but did not contest the jury's rejection
of this defense on appeal.
42. Rogers, 136 N.E. at 473.

43. As explained above, Rogers could not make a technical motion to suppress
in 1922, but instead contested the confession admissibility in a more general pre-trial
request. See supra note 29.
44. Rogers, 136 N.E. at 473. The court apparently recognized "sweating" as a
well-understood term. See infra note 52.
45. The court described the Herald Examiner as "a morning daily newspaper
printed in Chicago and having a circulation of 400,000 daily." Rogers, 136 N.E. at
474.
46. Id.
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When a Chicago police official yesterday heard Judge
Fitch ... had ruled he would not allow confessions of prisoners to be introduced as evidence in criminal trials, he said 95
per cent. of the work of the department will be nullified if the
policy is permitted to prevail .... The court held that a
confession obtained after long mental and physical fatigue
should be construed as having been forced. It was pointed out
by the police official that few, if any, prisoners confess except
after lengthy examination.
"We are permitted to do less every day," continued
another official. "Pretty soon there won't be a police depart41
ment."
On appeal, Rogers claimed this article prejudiced the jury, 48 which
was not sequestered during the trial. 49 The court rejected this argument, 50 but went to great lengths to condemn the paper and the
prosecutor. The court stated:
The trial judge properly and persistently refused to allow
evidence of the confession to go to the jury, clearly on the
ground that the evidence satisfied him that Rogers had been
beaten into submission to force a confession. He was warranted in so doing, unless all the police department men
engaged or present at the sweating of Rogers were called as
witnesses and satisfied the court in good faith that the confession had not been so obtained by them. Instead of doing this,
the [prosecutor] contented himself with examining the man
who knew the least about what had taken place, [the robbed
47. Id. As in 1922, today most Illinois judges are popularly elected. See ILL.

REV. STAT. ch. 46, para. 2A-1.2(8) (1991); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, para. 2A-1.2(8),

Historical Note (Smith-Hurd 1977). Therefore, the paper's use of Judge Fitch's name
was significant.
48. Rogers, 136 N.E. at 474.
49. The trial judge "allowed the jury to separate," although there were
provisions for sequestration in 1922. Id. at 473; see generally Leonard L. Cavise,
Trial Rights and Procedures,in ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at 259.
Rogers also raised several other arguments. He claimed that the prosecutor
improperly commented on the confession in opening argument, that the evidence did
not show a completed armed robbery, and that the trial judge erred when sentencing.
Rogers, 136 N.E. at 472-73. The supreme court rejected these arguments, indicating
that, in light of the evidence against Rogers, it did "not think a new trial would
result otherwise than in a conviction." Id. at 473; see supra note 41.
50. The court held that it could not reverse the conviction on this basis because
"there [was] no showing in the record that any juror saw this article before the trial
was concluded or afterwards." Rogers, 136 N.E. at 474.
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clerk], who ...

did not come onto the scene, apparently, until

the police had succeeded, by fair or foul means-the court

was not advised which-in getting Rogers into a humor to

confess."

The Rogers court then gave a lengthy tirade against the coercive police
practices indicated in the HeraldExaminer article. 2 Finally, explicitly
51. Id. at 473 (emphasis added).
52. The court declared:
In view of the sentiments expressed in the above article by the police
department, we deem it proper to give this article further notice, although
not necessary to a decision of this case. The sentiment so expressed confirms
a preconceived opinion of this court, or at least of several members thereof,
that it has been the practice of the Chicago police, in a number of cases, to
extort confessions from the suspects arrested by them by means of what is
called "the sweating process," the meaning of which is well understood
without further explanation. This sweating process has in no doubt been
accompanied in some cases by violence or beating of the suspect into making
a confession. It is not the right of a policeman ...

to resort to such tactics

to secure a confession. It is absolutely a violation of the law and of the
prisoner's rights .

. .

. The practice of punishing a suspect by blows or other

violence when he otherwise refuses to confess is a violation of the criminal
law itself, and renders a policeman subject to criminal prosecution for such
conduct ...

.

. It is the duty of the policemen of Chicago to do all in their

power to honorably and in a legal way secure evidence against parties who
violate the criminal laws in the city, and there is plenty for them to do in
this line in all cases. The legitimate way is to get out in the field where the
crimes are committed and hunt up legitimate evidence ...

and at the same

time respect the constitutional and legal rights of suspects arrested for crime.
A conviction secured by the brutal and criminal practices already mentioned
is not in the interest of putting down crime but quite to the contrary. Its
natural tendency is rather to increase crime and absolute disrespect for the
law and for the courts. We can conceive of no more beastly and criminal
practice than the securing of convictions in the manner indicated ....
We desire to say, in conclusion, that we have not volunteered these
closing remarks for the purpose of criticizing or abusing any one, but for
the purpose of emphasizing the fact that such practice must not be resorted
to with the understanding that it can have any sort of favor by this court.
Trial judges ought not to be criticized when they are following the law and
trying cases in a legal and orderly manner. And . . . it is not the legal

privilege of a powerful newspaper or any other newspapers, printed in the
jurisdiction where the trial occurs, .

.

. to get [a coerced confession] before

a jury.
Id. at 474-75. This is part of the obvious dicta in Rogers that has been quoted and
criticized by Illinois judges. Nevertheless, one federal court, expressing a very similar
attitude, cited Rogers with approval in 1955. United States v. Murphy, 222 F.2d 698,
703 n.9 (2d Cir. 1955).
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recognizing that these comments were not necessary to its decision,
the court concluded:
[i]t is the duty of the trial judge in every case, when he has
reason to suspect that a confession has been extorted from the
defendant, to absolutely refuse to permit any evidence as to
the confession, until the state has examined every police officer
and every one present at such examination, so that the full
truth may be disclosed. 5"
II.

APPLICATION OF THE MATERIAL WITNEss RULE

The rule developed in the Rogers dicta was applied to a large
number of cases without question for almost forty years.5 4 The rule
was specifically linked to the State's burden of proving a confession
voluntary; "[o]nly by producing all material witnesses connected with
the controverted confession can the State discharge this burden.""
Therefore, the State was required to call any witnesses who could
testify regarding police misconduct or the voluntary nature of the
confession.5 6 In 1962, the court remarked: "In an unbroken line of
cases originating with People v. Rogers. . . . this court has enforced
57
this rule.''
The legislature recognized this line of cases in 1963, when it
confirmed the vitality of the rule by specifically mentioning it in an
amendment to the suppression 'motion statute.5" The amendment,
which became effective in 1964, added a waiver provision to the

53. Rogers, 136 N.E. at 475.

54. See supra note 4; People v. Wright, 180 N.E.2d 689, 691 (Il. 1962) (listing
many Illinois Supreme Court cases discussing the material witness rule). The main
early questions involving the rule concerned whether particular witnesses were, in
fact, material. See, e.g., People v. Sammons, 161 N.E.2d 322 (Ill. 1959); People v.
Sloss, 104 N.E.2d 807 (Ill. 1952); People v. ArendarcZyk, 12 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 1937);
see generally People v. Dale, 171 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ill. 1960) (discussing the adequacy of
a material witness's excuse for not testifying).
55. Wright, 180 N.E.2d at 691; see also People v. Ickes, 19 N.E.2d 373 (Ill.
1939) (holding the State did not carry its burden when it did not call all material

witnesses).
56. People v. Brooks, 505 N.E.2d 336, 339 (Ill. 1987).
57. Wright, 180 N.E.2d at 691 (citation omitted).
58. See supra note 33 (setting out the statute). The original statute was ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 736.1 (1953). Through a 1963 amendment, section 736.1
was repealed as of January 1, 1964, and was replaced by the current provision. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-11 (1965), now located at 725 ILCS 5/114-11 (1993).
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statute, requiring the defendant to raise any objection to the absence
of material witnesses "in the trial court." 5 9

In 1960, however, judicial complaints about the rule's application
began. In People v. Dale,60 a majority of the court noted that the

rule had been applied since 1922, but also recognized, "as was pointed
out in People v. Jennings, . . . [the material witness rule] is not a

mechanical rule but a practical one, designed to assist the court in

determining whether the confession was voluntary." ' 61 The Dale majority applied the rule to reverse the defendant's conviction and

remand for a new trial. 62 The court rejected the State's argument that
a material witness, an officer who allegedly beat the defendant, was
excused from testifying because he was needed to testify in a different

courtroom while the Dale trial was conducted. 61
Justice Bristow, joined by Justice Hershey, dissented. 64 Justice

Bristow believed that the testimony of several other officers denying
that the defendant was mistreated was sufficient in this case for
several reasons. 65 He complained the majority "turn[ed] what is
supposed [to be] a practical test . . . into an inflexible rule." 66 Justice
Bristow concluded that the Dale opinion improperly "exalted a dictum

first announced in an opinion which went to great lengths to excoriate
police practices."

67

59. See supra note 33.
60. 171 N.E.2d 1 (I11.
1960).
61. Dale, 171 N.E.2d at 2 (citations omitted). The language quoted in Dale
from People v. Jennings, 144 N.E.2d 612 (I11.
1957), has been quoted in many
subsequent opinions, though the Jennings court cited no authority for this proposition. Jennings, 144 N.E.2d at 616.
62. Dale, 171 N.E.2d at 2. Anthony Dale had been convicted of robbery. Id.
63. Id.

64. Id. As the Illinois Supreme Court consists of seven justices, the Dale
majority had five members.
65. Id. at 3 (Bristow, J., dissenting). First, the defendant did not file a motion
to suppress, and thus "did not put the People on notice that he would challenge the
voluntariness of his confession" until he challenged it during the State's case-in-chief.
Id. (Bristow, J., dissenting). Additionally, after the State explained that the absent
officer was at another trial, the defense did not object to his absence. Id. (Bristow,
J., dissenting) ("The record is convincing that the explanation of [the officer's]
absence was accepted by all parties."). Moreover, there was, in the dissent's opinion,
overwhelming evidence, aside from the confession, that the defendant was guilty. Id.
at 4 (Bristow, J., dissenting). Finally, Dale was tried by a judge, not a jury. Id.
(Bristow, J., dissenting) (noting that "in a bench trial it will be presumed the trial
court rested its finding of guilty upon [only] the competent evidence").
66. Id. at 3 (Bristow, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Jennings, 144 N.E.2d 612
(I11.
1957)).
67. Id. at 4 (Bristow, J., dissenting).
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Although Justice Hershey concurred with Justice Bristow under

the Dale facts, just one year later, in People v. Sims, 68 he wrote a
majority opinion making a strong statement in favor of the material
witness rule. The Sims opinion traces the development of the rule69
through sixteen Illinois Supreme Court opinions, including Dale.
The Sims court noted that the material witness rule was phrased

differently in some opinions, but recognized the "dominant theme
that, when the voluntary character of a confession has been timely

and properly put in issue, all witnesses whose testimony is material to
the issue should be called or their absence explained." 7 0 Further, the

court explained that this requirement is part of the State's burden of
showing voluntariness.' In Sims, all officers present during the alleged

acts of coercion testified that the confession was voluntary.72 There-

fore, the court held that the trial judge's decision to admit the

confession was not against the manifest weight of the evidence."
Justice House, joined by Justices Bristow and Klingbiel, specially

concurred in the opinion.7 4 He stated: "I question the practicality of
the rule which originated with People v. Rogers." 7 5 Justice House
argued Rogers was wrong to create "a hard and fast rule" and
contended the Dale dissent "point[ed] up its inflexibility." 76 According

to Justice House, the material witness rule "places form above
substance" and he argued that voluntariness is "a matter of compe-

tency of evidence [which] should be left to the discretion of the trial
judge." '7 Under his proposal:
1961).
68. 173 N.E.2d 494 (I11.
69. Id. at 495-97. These opinions, in chronological order, are: People v. Rogers,
1922); People v.
136 N.E. 470 (I11. 1922); People v. Sweeney, 136 N.E. 687 (I11.
1929); People
1924); People v. Holick, 169 N.E. 169 (I11.
Spranger, 145 N.E. 706 (I11.
1931); People v. Arendarczyk, 12 N.E.2d 2 (Ill. 1937);
v. Cope, 178 N.E. 95 (I11.
People v. Kraus, 69 N.E.2d 885 (Ill. 1946); People v. Davis, 77 N.E.2d 703 (I11.
1948); People v. Scott, 81 N.E.2d 426 (Ill. 1948); People v. LaCoco, 94 N.E.2d 178
1950); People v. Sloss, 104 N.E.2d 807 (111. 1952); People v. Gavurnik, 117
(111.
1956); People v.
1954); People v. Wagoner, 133 N.E.2d 24 (I11.
N.E.2d 782 (I11.
Jennings, 144 N.E.2d 612 (II. 1957); People v. Sammons, 161 N.E.2d 322 (I1l. 1959);
and People v. Dale, 171 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1960).
70. Sims, 173 N.E.2d at 495.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 497. The defendant, George Sims, was convicted of murder. Id. at
495.
73. Id. at 498.
74. 173 N.E.2d at 498-99 (House, J., specially concurring) (citation omitted).
75. Id. at 498 (House, J., specially concurring).
76. Id. (House, J., specially concurring).
77. Id. (House, J., specially concurring).
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If,in order to satisfy himself of the competency of a confession, [the judge] requires all of the material witnesses to be
called, he should do so. On the other hand, if he were satisfied
to hear less than all of such witnesses, that also should be

within his discretionary power ....71

The Illinois Supreme Court decided its next major material
witness rule case in 1972. People v. Armstrong 9 followed the Sims
majority and again affirmed the validity of the rule.80 In Armstrong,

the court noted that the material witness rule had been applied

"consistently" and explained: "Only by producing all material witnesses connected with the controverted confession can the State
discharge its burden" of proving voluntariness.8 ' The court reversed

the defendant's conviction 2 and remanded for a new trial because
three police officers, who were material witnesses, did not testify at
the suppression hearing.83 The Armstrong majority did not find the
State's explanation that one officer was on vacation and another
"should be on furlough" acceptable.8 4
In dissent, Chief Justice Underwood explained that he "c[ould]
not agree with the court's automatic application of the material

witness rule to reverse this conviction."8 s5 He found that a vacation
was a valid excuse for one officer's absence 6 and determined that the
other officers' testimony would not have added to the voluntariness

78. Id. (House, J., specially concurring).
79. 282 N.E.2d 712 (I11.
1972).
80. Id.at 715.

81. Id. (quoting People v. Wright, 180 N.E.2d 689 (Ill. 1962)). The Armstrong
court also quoted the Wright court's determination that the rule had been applied
"[ijn an unbroken line of cases." Id. (quoting Wright, 180 N.E.2d at 691); see supra
notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
82. Id. Eugene Armstrong had been convicted of murder and armed robbery
and sentenced to death. Id. at 713.
83. Id. at 715. One of these officers conducted the first interrogation of the
defendant and another allegedly beat the defendant. Id. at 714-15. The third officer
was present at the defendant's arrest and interrogation. Id. at 715.
84. Id. The prosecutor did not even attempt to explain the absence of the third
officer, contending "the State doesn't have to call every police officer involved." Id.
85. Id. at 716 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
86. "In my opinion we may properly notice the fact that the scheduling of
vacations for members of metropolitan police forces is sufficiently complex that it
would be virtually impossible, or at least highly impractical, to have every police
officer connected with a case constantly available." Id. (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
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determination.1 7 In the Chief Justice's view, "claims of police brutality, coercion and intimidation are routinely made by defendants in
those cases in which confessions exist." ' s8 Therefore, he argued such
allegations should not lead to automatic reversal.8 9 He suggested that
the material witness rule be "treated simply as a general guideline to
be applied in those situations where . . . the testimony of the absent
witness would be of substantial value in resolving the question of

voluntariness.'" 9
I1.
A.

LIMITATION AND ELIMINATION OF THE MATERIAL WITNESS RULE
SUBSTANTIAL LIMITS ON THE RULE

Despite the strong majority support the rule received in Dale,
Sims, and Armstrong, it was greatly limited by the court in other
cases. 9 ' Two years before Armstrong, the court held that the material
witness rule should not apply to identification testimony challenged
in a motion to suppress. 92 In People v. Stokes, the defendants did not
confess, 93 but argued that the material witness rule should apply to
their allegation that they were denied the chance to have a lawyer
present at their line-up. 94 The Stokes court reviewed the history of the
87. Id. (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).

88. Id. (Underwood, C.J. dissenting). This apparent belief that police practices
need not always be carefully scrutinized is contrary to the Rogers court's statements

about police brutality as well as the pronouncements by the Supreme Court in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 426 (1966) and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478
(1964). See also GEORGE, supra note 19, at 103-105 (explaining data available in 1966
regarding coercive police practices); Bauman, supra note 19, at 103, 129 (relying in
part on Linda P. Campbell, Police Brutality Triggers Many Complaints, Little Data,
CHI. TRIB., Mar. 24, 1991, § 1, at 16, and David Jackson, Fine Line Between Tough
Police Work, Brutality, CHI. TRIB., July 14, 1991, § 1, at 1).
89. Armstrong, 282 N.E.2d at 716 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting). In fairness,
Chief Justice Underwood also recognized that such claims should not be "routinely
dismissed" either. Id. (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
90. Id. (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
91. In addition to the limitations discussed below, see infra notes 92-111 and
accompanying text, the doctrines of waiver and harmless error were applied to the
1975) (waiver);
material witness rule. See, e.g., People v. Terrell, 338 N.E.2d 383 (I11.
1965) (waiver); People v. Carpenter, 347
People v. Olmstead, 205 N.E.2d 625 (I11.
N.E.2d 781 (I11. App. Ct. 1976) (waiver); People v. Ranlon, 570 N.E.2d 742 (I11.
App. Ct. 1991) (harmless error).
1970).
92. People v. Stokes, 263 N.E.2d 21, 23 (I11.
93. Id. at 22-23. The three defendants were found guilty of armed robbery. Id.
at 22.
94. Id. at 23.
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rule, explaining that when Rogers was decided in 1922, "a defendant
did not, of course, enjoy the protections now available against his
allegedly coerced confession being admitted into evidence." 95 Yet, the
court recognized that "a majority of the court [recently] felt that the
use of the rule should be continued." 9 6 Reaching the issue in the case,
the court stated, "the circumstances which gave rise to the rule in the
earlier confession cases do not exist in the present identification cases,
particularly with the advent of United States v. Wade . . . [and]
Gilbert v. California. ' 97 Therefore, the Illinois Supreme Court held
that, at an identification suppression hearing, the absence of a material
witness to a line-up "will not of itself require the reversal of a
conviction. "98

Additionally, the rule was reasonably limited in 1975. In People
v. King,99 the court did not directly address the material witness
rule,"00 but considered whether the appellate court properly remanded
the case for a new trial when it found that a trial judge did not hold
a confession voluntariness hearing.' 0 The State contended that a new
trial should be ordered only if, after a remand for a proper suppression
hearing, the trial judge found the confession involuntary. 0 2 The court
agreed, explaining that reversing the conviction and requiring a new
trial without first determining that the confession was involuntary
"would be uncalled for and wasteful."' 03 This rationale was adopted

95. Id.
96. Id. (discussing Sims).
97. Id. (citations omitted). In United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967), the

Supreme Court held that line-ups, while not implicating the Fifth Amendment, may
involve Sixth Amendment rights. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), a
companion case to Wade, also applied some Sixth Amendment protections to showups. Stokes was decided while Wade and Gilbert were still good law. In 1972, the
Supreme Court greatly limited those cases in Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972).
98. Stokes, 263 N.E.2d at 23.
99. 335 N.E.2d 417 (Ill. 1975).
100. The court decided an interesting material witness rule case, involving a
juvenile defendant, on the same day as King. People v. Lamb, 336 N.E.2d 753 (I11.
1975). The Lamb majority found no material witness problem where some confession
witnesses were absent, although the young defendant was handcuffed to a wall while
seated in a chair overnight, because he did not claim he was mistreated at the time
the confession actually was made. 336 N.E.2d at 757.
101. King, 335 N.E.2d at 418.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court noted that this holding was consistent with United States
Supreme Court precedent and with Illinois law in similar areas. Id.at 418-19.
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by the appellate court'0 and then the supreme court' 05 for violations
of the material witness rule as well.
Finally, in 1992, the material witness rule was greatly limited in
People v. Patterson.c6 The Patterson court first determined that at
least one officer not called by the State at the suppression hearing
was a material witness to the defendant's confession.'07 Then, the
court explained: "Nonetheless, the material witness rule is not a
mechanical rule but a practical one, designed to assist the court in
determining whether a confession was voluntary."'0 8 According to the
Patterson court, "The purpose of the material witness rule is to
safeguard against improperly induced confessions and not to require
an empty exercise."' 9 The court cited Justice House's Sims special

concurrence several times, and concluded:
In the final analysis, whether a confession is voluntary or
involuntary is a matter of competency of the evidence which
should be left to the discretion of the trial court. .

.

. If in

order to resolve the matter, the trial court requires that all of
the material witnesses be called, it should do so. Yet, if the
trial court is satisfied to hear less than all of such witnesses,

that should also be within the court's discretionary power and
a reviewing court should reverse only where there has been a

clear abuse of that discretion. 1' 0

App. Ct. 1984); People
104. See, e.g., People v. Parquette, 462 N.E.2d 701 (I11.
v. Tucker-El, 463 N.E.2d 991 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
1987).
105. See, e.g., People v. Brooks, 505 N.E.2d 336 (I11.
106. 610 N.E.2d 16 (Iii. 1992).

107. Id. at 31-32. The defendant, Aaron Patterson, confessed to the double
homicide and armed robbery for which he was convicted. He was sentenced to death.
Id. at 22. Patterson made several allegations of police brutality which he argued were
supported by "writings" purportedly made by him while he was alone in the police
interrogation room. Id. at 33. These writings, found on the room bench and door,
were:
I lied about the murders police threatened me with violence slapped and
suffocated me with plastic [bag] - no phone - no dad signed false
statement to murders (Tonto) Aaron.
Sign false statements to murder, Tonto on statements is code word
Id.

Aaron ... Aaron. lied.

108. Id. at 32 (citations omitted).
109. Id.
110. Id. All evidence against Patterson, aside from the confession, was circumstantial. The Patterson court recognized the compelling nature of confessions, but
said: "[the confession] remains, nonetheless, but one piece of evidence in an entire
circumstantial evidence case." Id. at 25.
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Applying this test, the court refused to find that the trial judge abused

his discretion by admitting the confession, in part because the judge
made a specific finding that he did not need to hear the missing
.
material witnesses.'
B.

ELIMINATION OF THE RULE

After adopting Justice House's material witness test in Patterson,
the court suddenly eliminated the rule in April, 1993, in People v.
R.D. 1 2 In both R.D. and its companion case, People v. Blankenship," 3 the Fifth Division 1 4 of the First District Illinois Appellate
6
Court reversed the defendants' convictions" 5 in unpublished orders"
and remanded for new suppression hearings." 7 The R.D. appellate
court reversed and remanded because two officers who witnessed the
111. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d at 25-26.

112. People v. R.D., 613 N.E.2d 706 (111. 1993); see supra note 11.
113. 613 N.E.2d 706 (Ill. 1993) (consolidated with R.D., No. 72268); see supra
note 11.
114. In the petitions for leave to appeal filed for R.D. and Blankenship, the
state alleged that the Fifth Division had acted contrary to Illinois law and had ignored
applicable precedent by reversing and remanding these cases. Petition for Leave to
Appeal at 12-15, People v. R.D., (Ill. 1993) (No. 72268); Petition for Leave to
Appeal at 12-15, People v. Blankenship, (Ill. 1992) (No. 72269); see infra note 121
and accompanying text.
115. R.D., a minor, was adjudicated a delinquent based on a burglary to which
he confessed. R.D., 613 N.E.2d at 126. Alex Blankenship was convicted, on stipulated
evidence, of possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. Id. at 12829; People v. Blankenship, No. 1-89-3466, slip op. at 1, 6 (Il1. App. Ct. June 14,
1991) (unpublished order) [hereinafter Blankenship appellate order]. Blankenship
aggressively challenged the legality of his arrest, the propriety of the police search
which uncovered the controlled substance, 30 grams of cocaine, the admissibly of
evidence from the search, and the admissibility of the statements he made to the
police during and after the search. Blankenship appellate order at 2-6. Once he lost
his motions to quash and suppress, however, he allowed a "stipulated bench trial"
to proceed during which only stipulations regarding the cocaine were read to the trial
judge. Id. at 1, 6.
116. Under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23, the appellate court may dispose of
a case with an unpublished order, instead of through a published opinion, when the
case does not involve a novel issue, any change in the existing law, a conflict in the
existing law, a substantial public interest, or when the decision does not "constitute[]
a significant contribution to legal literature." ILL. S. CT. R. 23. Rule 23 orders have
no precedential value, except between or among the parties to the case, and may not
be cited as legal authority by other parties. ILL. S. CT. R. 23.
117. People v. R.D., No. 1-90-2417, slip op. at 6 (Ill. App. Ct. June 14, 1991)
(unpublished order) [hereinafter R.D. appellate order]; Blankenship appellate order
at 10; see generally supra notes 99-105 and accompanying text (explaining the use of
remand procedures in material witness rule cases).
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interrogation of R.D. and saw him confess were not called to testify
at the suppression hearing.' The court held that, in the officers'
absence, the State did not carry its burden of proving the voluntariness
of the confession.

19

Similarly, the Blankenship appellate court reversed and remanded

because it determined that two officers who did not testify at the

suppression hearing were material witnesses. 120 These officers were
present when the defendant allegedly requested an attorney, and thus
were material to his claim that his statements were involuntary because

12
this request was denied in violation of Miranda. ' Several other
Divisions of the First District Appellate Court, as well as the Third
and Fourth Districts, previously had determined that the material
witness rule should not apply to confessions that are allegedly involuntary because of Miranda violations. 122 Nonetheless, the Blankenship

appellate court believed that a remand was necessary to satisfy the
"purpose of the material witness rule, to prevent the use of improperly
23

induced confessions." 1
Before the Illinois Supreme Court, the State raised two main
arguments: first, the material witness rule should not apply to allegations that confessions are involuntary solely because of Miranda
violations;' u and, second, when the rule does apply, it should be less
stringent.'25 In support of both contentions, the State asserted that
118. R.D. appellate order at 5.
119. Id.

120. Blankenship appellate order at 8-9.
121. Id.; see generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Edwards v.
Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
122. People v. Fasse, 528 N.E.2d 1049 (I11.App. Ct. 4th Dist. 1988); People v.
Robinson, 410 N.E.2d 121 (I11.App. Ct. 3d Dist. 1980); People v. Jones, 376 N.E.2d
618 (I11.App. Ct. 1st Dist., 4th Div. 1978); People v. McClure, 358 N.E.2d 23 (111.
App. Ct. 1st Dist., 3d Div. 1976); People v. Richardson, 316 N.E.2d 37 (I11.App.
Ct. 1st Dist., 1st Div. 1974). The State stressed this apparent conflict in its Blankenship
petition for leave to appeal. Petition for Leave to Appeal at 2-3, People v. Blankenship, (I11.1992) (No. 72269); see supra notes 11, 112.
123. Blankenship appellate order at 9 (citing In re J.C., 387 N.E.2d 401 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1979)).
124. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 2, R.D. (I11.1993) (Nos. 72268, 72269)
[hereinafter State's Brief].
125. State's Brief at 2, 4. For example, the State contended that a trial judge
should have wide discretion in determining materiality, id. at 49, and should be
permitted to not apply the rule "when a defendant fails to make a meritorious claim
of coercion." Id. at 41. Moreover, the State requested that a harmless error analysis
be applied to material witness rule questions in all cases. Id. at 58; see supra note
90. The State relied on Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246 (1991), to support its
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"current constitutional safeguards,"' '

6

not in existence when Rogers

was decided, "diminished significantly" the need to "use the material
witness rule as a safeguard . . . against involuntary self-incrimination."'1 7 The State argued that the rule had been questioned and
limited consistently since its creation, relying primarily on Stokes, 28
the Dale dissent,'

29

the Sims special concurrence,

30

and the legislative

amendment applying the waiver doctrine to the rule.' 3' Nonetheless,
the State explained it was "not advocating the complete abandonment
of the rule"' ' 32 but only requesting "relaxation" of the rule.'1 The
State quoted Justice House's material witness rule test and requested
that the court adopt House's approach.' 34 In other words, the State
urged the court to do what it did in Patterson.'35
harmless error analysis. See Bauman, supra note 19; J.Cenicola, Note, Arizona v.
Fulminante: Accusation or Inquisition?, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 383 (1992).
126. According to the State, these "safeguards" primarily stem from United
States Supreme Court cases decided in the 1960s, including: Rogers v. Richmond,
365 U.S. 534 (1961) (holding that the truth of a confession is irrelevant to a
voluntariness determination); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (applying the Fifth
Amendment to the states); Miranda v, Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring
cautionary warnings before custodial interrogation as a Fifth Amendment protection);
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (requiring a preliminary determination of
confession voluntariness by a judge, not a jury); and Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964) (enforcing a defendant's right to counsel when he or she is in custody and
repeatedly requests an attorney). Interestingly, the State argued "the Escobedo
holding was greatly expanded in Miranda." State's Brief at 34. This argument
obviously is contrary to most commentary on these cases, which recognizes that
Miranda eliminated the use of the theoretical basis, the Sixth Amendment, behind
Escobedo. See STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 462-93 (3d
ed. 1988). Of course, with the exception of Fulminante, which the State used to
support a different argument, see supra note 125, the State did not mention any of
the numerous limitations the Supreme Court has placed on these cases in the decades
since the 1960s. See generally Matt Pawa, Comment, When the Supreme Court
Restricts ConstitutionalRights, Can Congress Save Us?, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1029
(1993); Note, Winship on Rough Waters: the Erosion of the Reasonable Doubt
Standard, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1993).
127. State's Brief at 1, 32.
128. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
129. See supra notes 64-67 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 74-78 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text; supra note 33.
132. State's Brief at 55. In its Reply Brief, the State again stressed it was "not
advocating the extinction of the rule." Reply Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 9, R.D.
(Ill.
1993) (Nos. 72268, 72269).
133. State's Brief at 31, 41, 43.
134. State's Brief at 54 (quoting People v. Sims, 173 N.E.2d 494, 498 (I1. 1961)
(House, J., specially concurring)). The State noted the Fifth Division's reluctance to
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In contrast to the State, the defendants both filed relatively short
briefs, 3 6 and simply argued that the material witness rule was necessary to protect Fifth Amendment rights and was essential to ensuring
the State carries its burden of proving the voluntariness of confessions.'"
The court characterized the State's argument as an invitation to
eliminate the rule' and began its opinion by criticizing the Rogers
court for promulgating "a hard and fast rule" which was not necessary to its decision.3 9 The court noted the legislative application of
the waiver rule to the material witness rule.' 4° Then, it reviewed the
non-majority opinions in Dale, Sims, and Armstrong, concluding,
"[it is evident that most of the criticism of the material witness rule
has been directed at the manner in which reviewing courts have
applied the rule."'' 4 Next, the court mentioned that it attempted to
remedy the problem of mechanical review in Patterson. 42 Yet, instead
of explaining that Patterson essentially granted the relief requested by
the State in this case, the R.D. court stated: "We now conclude that
the rationale of Patterson should be taken to its logical conclusion
43
and that the material witness rule should be repudiated entirely.'
The R.D. court rested this conclusion on two main bases: the
expanded rights given criminal defendants through Illinois procedural
and discovery rules; and the "constitutional safeguards" available
under United States Supreme Court cases. First, according to the
court, "[aifter Rogers was decided ... our legislature and this court
14
adopted procedures allowing for liberal discovery in criminal cases."'
These rules require the State to disclose, before trial, the substance
of any statements made by the defendant. 45 Also, the state must
follow House's test as "too flexible to be serviceable." Id. at 55 (quoting People v.
Ralon, 570 N.E.2d 742 (Il1. App. Ct. 1st Dist., 5th Div. 1974)).
135. People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 31 (111. 1992). R.D. was fully briefed
in the supreme court by August, 1992, before Patterson was decided. Therefore, the
State was not making a frivolous or ridiculous argument in the R.D. briefs.
136. R.D. and Blankenship were represented by different counsel throughout
their court proceedings. Their individual briefs, however, contained very similar
arguments regarding the material witness rule.
137. Brief for Defendant-Appellee R.D. at 7-8, R.D. (Ill. 1993) (Nos. 72268,
72269); Brief for Defendant-Appellee Blankenship at 19-20, R.D. (Ill. 1993) (Nos.
72268, 72269).
138. People v. R.D., 613 N.E.2d 706, 714 (Ill. 1993).
139. Id. at 712.
140. Id. at 713.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 714; see supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text.
143. R.D., 613 N.E.2d at 714.
144. Id. at 715.
145. Id. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 114-10 (1991); ILL. S. CT. R. 412(a)(ii).
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provide a list of witnesses to any statements. 146 The R.D. court
additionally explained that the suppression motion statute and its
specific pre-trial hearing procedure "did not exist at the time our
court created the material witness rule.' ' 47 The R.D. court stated that
these provisions give the defendant enough information and protection
that he or she can call any material witnesses at the suppression
hearing, and thus "there is no need for a separate rule requiring the
48
State to produce such witnesses." 1
Moreover, the material witness rule "compensated to some extent
for the lack of protections now afforded to the defendant" under
Mirandaand its progeny. 149 The R.D. court explained that, in Stokes,
"[the] court .. .relied upon the expanded constitutional protections

now available to criminal defendants as a reason for refusing to
expand the scope of the material witness rule."' 50 The court resolved:
"Following the reasoning in Stokes, we likewise conclude that the
circumstances which created a need for the material witness rule in
1922 do not currently exist."'' According to R.D., "whether a
confession is voluntary or involuntary is a matter of the competency
of the evidence which should be left to the discretion of the trial
52
court."1
IV.

THE ERROR IN ELIMINATING THE MATERIAL WITNESs RULE

In R.D., the court showed a clear disregard for precedent and
for the Fifth Amendment. The court ignored the careful refinements
of the rule in the 70 years since Rogers and improperly rejected the
benefits of the rule. Now, as explained below,"' a defendant hoping
to challenge the voluntariness of his or her confession faces a much
more serious challenge. The burden of exercising Fifth Amendment
rights should not be so great.
A.

THE INCORRECT REASONS FOR ABOLISHING THE RULE

The Illinois Supreme Court made four main errors in abolishing
the material witness rule. First, all criticism of Rogers properly
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

ILL. S. CT. R. 412(a)(ii).
R.D., 613 N.E.2d at 716.
Id. at 715.
Id. at 714-15.
Id. at 716.
Id.
Id.at 715.
See infra part IV.B.
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chastised the court for creating a rule in such an intemperate manner.
This criticism, however, does not justify the reckless death knell sent
to the rule under similar circumstances in R.D. Of course, the Illinois
Supreme Court, the court of "last resort" on Illinois law, is not
limited to deciding only the narrow issues before it. Nonetheless, one
obvious criticism of R.D. is that the court committed the same sin
for which the Rogers court was condemned. The R.D. court gave a
"hard and fast" rejection of the material witness rule when that
rejection was not requested by the State, 5 4 not briefed by the parties,
and was unnecessary to its decision."" The court easily could have
used the Stokes rationale to dispose of the Miranda issue and relied
on Patterson for the rest of the decision.
Second, the R.D. and Pattersoncourts incorrectly interpreted the
rule as it had evolved. After its shaky beginning, the material witness
rule was intelligently debated and contoured by the Illinois General
Assembly and Supreme Court. The legislature chose to apply the rule
of waiver to a material witness claim. This idea is consistent with
general Illinois waiver law, which provides that issues are waived
15 6
when a trial judge is not given a proper chance to rule on them.
The legislature did not eliminate the rule; rather, it simply placed a
reasonable and workable limit on its application.
The Dale, Sims, and Armstrong courts all rejected chances to
eliminate the rule. Unlike the Rogers court, these three courts were
presented with instances where confessions were admitted, yet they
still intelligently applied the rule. These courts did not "mechanically"
apply the rule, as charged by the non-majority opinions, but analyzed
the basis and need for the rule before carefully applying it to the facts
in issue. 1 7 In fact, in Sims, Justice Hershey changed his position on
154. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
155. See supra text accompanying note 135.
156. See People v. Enoch, 522 N.E.2d 1124 (Ill. 1988); People v. Roberts, 387
N.E.2d 331 (Ill. 1979).
157. For instance, in Dale, the court carefully considered, and rejected, the
argument that testifying in another courtroom made the material witness excuseably
absent. People v. Dale, 171 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ill. 1960); see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
In Sims, the court upheld the conviction, finding that all material witnesses were
called to testify. People v. Sims, 173 N.E.2d 494, 498 (Ill. 1961); see supra note 72
and accompanying text. This affirmance can hardly be deemed an inflexible or
mechanical application of a law which "unfairly burdens" the prosecution.
Finally, in Armstrong, there were three absent material witnesses. People v.
Armstrong, 282 N.E.2d 712, 714-15 (Ill. 1972). The court reversed because of the
absence of these witnesses, not because it blindly applied the material witness rule
without analysis. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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the rule after thoroughly surveying the applicable law and realizing
that the rule was a necessary part of the State's burden of proof.' 8
The careful determination in all three cases rejected any notion that
the rule should require automatic reversal and affirmed the idea that
the rule is necessary to ensure confession propriety.
Those decisions provided a strong grounding for the material
witness rule, and this base was not destroyed by Stokes or King. The
Stokes court confined its actual holding to the narrow issue before it:
should the rule apply to identification testimony. Unfortunately, the
5 9 It is
court also expounded on the need for the rule in general.
important to note, despite this dicta, that identification issues like the
issue in Stokes do not implicate the Fifth Amendment,' 60 that the
Stokes court still heeded the validity of the material witness rule, and
that two years later, in Armstrong, the court strongly affirmed the
rule's viability. Ultimately, the Stokes court simply held that Wade
and Gilbert, before they were limited by later Supreme Court decisions,' 6' provided a sufficient basis for confirming the admissibility
of identification testimony. This holding did not damage the material
witness rule.
Similarly, the King decision, which is well-grounded in reason
and Illinois law, did not harm the material witness rule. The material
witness rule is needed to avoid the danger of involuntary confessions.
Thus, if a confession is deemed voluntary at a proper suppression
hearing on remand, there is no reason for the material witness rule
to be used as a weapon against the conviction based on the uncoerced
confession.
Reviewing these cases and the state of the law when Patterson
reached the Illinois Supreme Court, it is unclear why the court was
so adamant that the rule was an unnecessary and mechanical nuisance,
or "empty exercise.' ' 62 In fact, the rule had been tempered and
molded to require the State to prove the voluntariness of confessions
without requiring a reversal of the conviction unless the defendant
raised the issue before the trial judge, the defendant explained the
actual materiality of the missing witness, and a trial judge found the
63
confession involuntary at a proper suppression hearing on remand.'
158. Sims, 173 N.E.2d at 495.

159. See supra text accompanying note 95.
160. See supra note 97.
161. See supra note 97.
162. People v. Patterson, 610 N.E.2d 16, 32 (Ill. 1992).
163. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 59; see also supra note 91 (listing
several other reasonable limitations imposed on the material witness rule).
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Therefore, in both Patterson and R.D., the court incorrectly created
the illusion that the material witness rule was extremely inflexible and
impossible to apply. Thus, there was no need for the Pattersoncourt
to adopt Justice House's approach, which had never gained a majority
before this point, without any evidence the rule was hampering the
administration of justice.
Third, the R.D. and Pattersoncourts incorrectly skirted the Fifth
Amendment significance of confessions. The R.D. court consistently
avoided mention of the State's burden of proving any confession
voluntary, under federal law as well as Illinois statutory and case law.
Instead, the court stressed that a confession should be treated merely
as an evidentiary matter. Although a confession technically is just
another piece of evidence admitted in a trial, its treatment obviously
involves more than "the competency of the evidence." The court was
dishonest when it ignored the fact that "a confession is 'the highest
type of evidence known to law." ' " 64 In fact, Supreme Court Justice
White recently called a confession the "most probative and damaging
evidence" available in a criminal trial, 65 and the Illinois Supreme
Court recognized this fact in 1866 when it called confessions "of the
highest order of evidence."' The court took a frightening step when
it glossed over the Fifth Amendment aspect of confessions in Patterson
and R.D.
Moreover, the elimination of the material witness rule because
discovery provisions allow the defendant to call any material witness
is completely contrary to the Fifth Amendment idea that the State
must prove voluntariness. Under well-settled Illinois and federal law, 67
the defense does not have to prove the confession was coerced; the
State must prove it was not. This rule of law is much older than the
material witness rule,'" and should not have been ignored by the
Illinois Supreme Court.
Additionally, the court incorrectly characterized the advent of
the suppression motion statute as the creation of a "new" safeguard
164. Eisenberg, supra note 6, at 53 (quoting People v. Byrd, 171 N.E.2d 782,
783 (Il. 1961)); see generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); see also supra
note 110.
165. Arizona v. Fulminante, Il1 S. Ct. 1246, 1255 (1991) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 195 (1987)); see Bauman, supra note 19,
at 119-21.
166. Miller v. People, 39 I11. 457, 462 (1866); see supra notes 23-25 and
accompanying text.
167. See supra part I.A.
168. See supra notes 23-25, 31-33 and accompanying text.
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merely codified
for Fifth Amendment rights. In reality, the statute
169
existing law into a specific pre-trial procedure.
. Finally, both asserted legal bases behind the R.D. court's elimination of the material witness rule were presented in a misleading
light by the court. Unlike the per se rule of Wade and Gilbert used
by the Stokes court to justify not extending the material witness rule
to a Sixth Amendment issue, the bases asserted in R.D. are not
absolute. Accordingly, the court's blanket reliance on the Stokes dicta
is unpersuasive.
For example, the court correctly recited the requirements of
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 412(a)(ii), 70 which requires the State to
disclose the substance of a defendant's statements as well as the names
of witnesses to those statements. The court did not explain, however,
that this rule is far from absolute. Only the substance of oral
statements must be disclosed, not the actual words used by the
defendant."' Importantly, the defense has the burden of proving any
discovery violation,' 72 and the judge has discretion to fashion a remedy
which probably will not involve suppression of the statement.'7
Additionally, on appeal, the defendant must prove that the Rule was
violated and must show, on the basis of the entire record, that the
violation "substantially prejudiced" him or her.' 74 Thus, while the
R.D. court was correct when it explained that Rule 412(a)(ii) provides
a right Harvey Rogers did not enjoy in 1922, the fact that Rule
412(a)(ii) is now available to a defendant should not mean he or she
loses the protection of the material witness rule, which places the
burden of proof on the State, not the defense.
Similarly, the R.D. court was not straightforward when it asserted
that Mirandaprovides enough protection to make the material witness
rule meaningless. While there can be no dispute that Miranda, even
in its current battered form,' 7" provides Fifth Amendment protections
169. See supra note 29.
170.

ILL.

S. CT. R. 412(a)(ii).

171. E.g., People v. Wielgos, 581 N.E.2d 298, 301 (I11.App. Ct. 1991).
172. E.g., People v. Patterson, 430 N.E.2d 574, 577 (I11.App. Ct. 1981).
173. E.g., People v. Washington, 537 N.E.2d 1354, 1358-59 (I11.App. Ct. 1989);
Richard S. Kling, PretrialProceduresand Practice, in ILLINOIS CRIMINAL PROCEDURE,
supra note 6, at 173-74. Exclusion of evidence as a sanction for a discovery violation
is permitted only as a "last resort." Washington, 537 N.E.2d at 1358.
174. E.g., People v. Carr, 544 N.E.2d 978, 983-84 (111. App. Ct. 1989).
175. The Court has greatly limited the effect of Miranda since its adoption in
1966. See, e.g., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971); Michigan v. Mosely, 423
U.S. 96 (1975); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S 714 (1975); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S.
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that were not in existence in 1922, Miranda involves broad protection
of Fifth Amendment rights, not a specific pre-trial procedure for
ensuring confession voluntariness. Even if a defendant has properly
received Miranda warnings, his or her confession still may be found
involuntary. 7 6 The existence of Miranda does not prove confession
voluntariness, but helps to ensure confessions are not coerced. 7 7 The
R.D. court substituted Miranda, a doctrine established to help ensure
that police do not coerce confessions, for the material witness rule, a
doctrine that establishes part of the State's burden of showing that
confessions are indeed voluntary. This sleight of hand harms criminal
defendants and endangers us all with its cavalier treatment of our
17
Constitutional rights.
B.

THE IMPACT OF R.D.

As explained above, the impact of R.D. is to place more of a
burden on the defendant to show his or her confession was not
voluntary. This violates the long-standing common law rule that the
State must prove voluntariness, 79 as well as the suppression statute's
placement of the burden of proof on the State. 80 R.D. is a very new
decision; thus it has not yet been applied to any cases on appeal.
Consider the following example, however.
Donna is arrested and properly given Miranda warnings by two
officers, Brutus and Brawny, but those officers later beat her into
confessing. Two other officers, Meek and Moe, witness the beating.
Meek is very upset by the event. Donna did not notice Meek in the
room while she was being beaten. Donna requests discovery, and the
State tenders a copy of her written confession and the names of
Brutus, Brawny, and Moe. At the suppression hearing, all three of
the disclosed officers testify that Donna was not coerced. Meek does
not testify. The trial judge rules that the confession is admissible, and

1039 (1983); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298 (1985); Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195 (1989); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S.
292 (1990); STEPHEN A.

SALTZBURG,

AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 432-542 (3d

ed. 1988).
176. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 474-75, 478.
177. The MirandaCourt explained that it wanted to create "proper safeguards"
for the Fifth Amendment. Id. at 467, 476; see supra notes 23-25 and accompanying
text.
178. See, e.g., Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453-56 (1895); In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970) (quoting Coffin).
179. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
180. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.

1993:1051

MATERIAL WITNESS RULE

the jury learns about the confession and hears other, not overwhelming, evidence of Donna's guilt. Donna is convicted.
On appeal, Donna's attorney learns that Meek also was in the
room. Donna cannot obtain a remand for a new suppression hearing
simply by coming forward with this evidence, as she could under the
material witness rule. Instead, she must prove the State's violation of
Rule 412(a)(ii) prejudiced her.'' As the evidence against her is not
overwhelming, she might win a remand. On the other hand, because
there is other evidence of her guilt, admission of the confession might
not have prejudiced her, and her conviction might be affirmed,
without a trier of fact ever seeing Meek. In any event, she cannot
take solace from the R.D. court's assertion that Miranda magically
will protect her and she must take on a burden of proof. Obviously,
this result is contrary to the earlier well-settled law in Illinois.
CONCLUSION

The material witness rule was created under admittedly questionable circumstances. The Rogers court cited no authority for its
assertions and obviously acted, at least in part, out of rage against
the Herald Examiner. Nonetheless, the rule was consistent with the
stance of the Illinois Supreme Court, made explicit as early as 1853,
against involuntary confessions and coercive police practices. In the
cases following Rogers, the court established a coherent reason and
Fifth Amendment analysis for the rule. The court also established
limits on the rule which avoided its claimed mechanical application.
These limits created a proper balance between the need for efficient
and practical suppression hearings and the need to ensure the voluntariness of confessions.
Therefore, the court's rash actions in Patterson and R.D. were
unnecessary and harmful to defendants' Fifth Amendment rights. The
rule was not retained by the court before 1993 because of a lack of
Fifth Amendment protections, but because the court, and the legislature, believed additional protections were needed for admission of
this "highest order of evidence."' ' 8 2 The R.D. court's rationale that
the rule is not needed and that confessions present merely "matter[s]
181. This is true whether she is claiming the State improperly answered the
discovery request or is claiming her attorney's failure to learn about Meek was
ineffective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984);
People v. Albanese, 473 N.E.2d 1246 (I11.1984) (adopting the Strickland test in
Illinois).
182. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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of the competency of the evidence"' 3 is based on faulty assumptions
and misses the larger Fifth Amendment implications that have been
considered inherent in confessions in Illinois since 1853. It is true that
the material witness rule should not be applied mechanically; it still
should be applied, however, as a means of ensuring that the State
properly carries its burden of proving that a confession is voluntary.
The Illinois General Assembly should not allow the court to nullify a
Fifth Amendment right in this manner.8 4 The material witness rule
should be resurrected from its untimely death, because, as Justice
Frankfurter explained, the State must be required to carry all aspects
of its burden of proof in a criminal trial and the defendant should
not have to take on a burden of proving that his confession was
coerced:
Because from the time that the law which we have inherited
has emerged from dark and barbaric times, the conception of
justice which has dominated our criminal law has refused to
put an accused at the hazard of punishment if he fails to
remove every reasonable doubt of his innocence in the minds
of jurors. It is the duty of the Government to establish his
guilt .... This notion [is] basic in our law and rightly one of
the boasts of a free society.' 85

183. People v. R.D., 613 N.E.2d 706, 717 (IIl. 1993).
184. This is especially true in light of the diminishing scope of United States
Supreme Court protection for the Fifth Amendment. See, e.g., Pawa, supra note
126; Ralph Ruebner, Preface to ILLINOIs CRIMNAL PROCEDURE, supra note 6, at xv.
185. Leland v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802-03 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

